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IN SUPPORT OF GLOBAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR PRIVATE 
COMMERCIAL SPACE ACTORS 
 
Julia Selman Ayetey* 
 
It is a pleasure to share my reflections on the theme “New Norms? Com-
mercial Actors.” Modern society is highly dependent on outer space. From 
agriculture, information technology, medicine, and transportation to energy, 
the environment and defense, outer space is used for many aspects of day-to-
day life. Most of these services are provided by private companies. Whilst 
these companies are usually subject to domestic laws, they are not held ac-
countable at an international level despite the fact their conduct may have 
global implications. My brief remarks center around two issues: the global 
public interest in space utilization and the need for global standards of ac-
countability for private commercial space actors. 
Space law and policy can sometimes appear to be largely concerned with 
intangible or hypothetical situations. In an effort to accentuate the practical 
realities of increasing utilization of outer space, the Swarm Technologies 
(“Swarm”) incident will be used to exemplify the importance of the global 
public interest and the need for global accountability measures for private 
commercial space actors. The full facts of the incident are multifaceted, how-
ever, due to time constraints a summary will suffice. 
Swarm is a company based in California. Their objective is to provide low-
cost internet to rural communities throughout the globe via satellite. In fur-
therance of this objective, Swarm applied to the Federal Communications 
Commission (“FCC”) in early 2017 for a license to both launch and operate 
its experimental “Space BEEs.” The Space BEEs were a bundle of four pico-
satellites, satellites which are relatively tiny compared to the more traditional 
satellites with which we have become familiar. Picosatellites are currently in 
a testing phase and not yet in common usage. After Swarm submitted its ap-
plication to the FCC, both parties engaged in conversations during which it 
became clear the FCC was concerned the Space BEEs were not going to be 
(easily) trackable. In December 2017, the FCC denied Swarm’s application, 
stating that to grant the application would be contrary to “the public interest.”1 
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 1 Letter from Anthony Serafini, Chief, Experimental Licensing Branch, Fed. 
Commc’ns Comm’n, to Sara Spangelo, Swarm Tech., Inc. (Dec. 12, 2017), available at htt 
ps://apps.fcc.gov/els/GetAtt.html?id=203152&x= (informing Swarm that the FCC would 
not be approving its grant application). 
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Shortly after receiving the notice of rejection and in direct contravention 
of the FCC’s decision, Swarm intentionally and unlawfully had its Space 
BEEs launched into orbit from India on an Indian rocket. About a month later, 
the FCC became aware that the Space BEEs had been launched. Its Enforce-
ment Bureau conducted an investigation and found that in addition to the un-
lawful launch, Swarm had conducted a litany of other unauthorized and illegal 
space activities. This included illegal communications and experiments be-
tween its satellites in orbit and ground stations right here in the state of Geor-
gia.2 In December 2018, Swarm admitted liability for violating provisions of 
the Communications Act 1934 (as amended) as well as the Code of Federal 
Regulations. Swarm agreed to a number of measures including payment of a 
$900,000 fine and implementation of a compliance plan.3 
Swarm violated domestic law, admitted liability and were, rightly, sanc-
tioned. Some might thus consider the matter settled. However, beyond the fact 
that the U.S. government would be potentially legally responsible and liable 
at the international level had the Space BEEs caused any damage, the Swarm 
incident raises a number of other issues, including its incursion into the global 
public interest. 
Before focusing on the concept of the global public interest, I would first 
like to highlight a related concept: the global commons—natural resources or 
areas which are shared by the global community as opposed to belonging to 
one or several states.4 Outer space, like Antarctica and the High Seas, for ex-
ample, have long been considered by many to be part of the global commons. 
This is a view I and a number of the panelists share.5 However, the notion of 
outer space as a global commons is being increasingly contested. The Execu-
tive Secretary of the National Space Council here in the U.S. has recently re-
iterated—quite clearly—the U.S. position that outer space is not a global 
 
 2 Swarm carried out unauthorized tests, including communication transmissions of var-
ious equipment. One such test involved “weather balloon-to-ground station tests, including 
on cars driving around Palo Alto, California, that exchanged radio signals.” In the Matter 
of Swarm Tech., Inc. FCC 18-184, 3 (2018), available at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attach 
ments/FCC-18-184A1.pdf. 
 3 The compliance plan included measures such as the creation of a compliance manual, 
implementation of a compliance training program for employees and the requirement to 
file pre-launch reports. In the Matter of Swarm Tech., Inc., supra note 2; Press Release, 
Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FCC Reaches $900,000 Settlement with Swarm for Unauthor-
ized Satellite Launch (2018), available at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-35 
5578A1.pdf. 
 4 SUSAN J BUCK, THE GLOBAL COMMONS: AN INTRODUCTION (1998). 
 5 Cassandra Steer, Global Commons, Cosmic Commons: Implications of Military and 
Security Uses of Outer Space, 18 GEO. J. INT’L AFF. 1, 9–16 (2017); Frans G von der Dunk, 
Target Practising in a Global Commons: The Chinese ASAT Test and Outer Space Law, 
22 KOR. J. AIR & SPACE L. & POL’Y 1, 55–74 (2007). 
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commons.6 Nevertheless, the fact is that outer space is beyond the territorial 
jurisdiction of all states. This makes all space activities a matter of concern 
for the entire international community. My remarks are therefore based on the 
premise that there is an inherent global public interest in the use of outer space. 
So, what is this notion of the global public interest? Kulick states that it is 
“all interests inhering a pivotal importance for the international community 
and bearing relevance on both the domestic and international levels.”7 In the 
context of space specifically, Jakhu defines it as “the inclusive interest of the 
international community in outer space.”8 International space law principles, 
particularly those in the Outer Space Treaty 1967, support the notion of the 
global public interest.9 The objects that go into space, where they are placed, 
how fast they’re traveling, whether they crash to the Earth’s surface or collide 
with other space objects, and the quantity of debris they generate, are all ex-
amples of information that are vital to the international community. Being 
unaware of what objects are launched or being unaware that certain radio fre-
quencies are being used to transmit from satellites—both of which were an 
issue with Swarm and its Space BEEs—can spell many problems beyond the 
simple interruption of our satellite television, internet service or GPS. It could 
result in, for example, interruption to international aviation networks, desta-
bilization of telemedicine platforms which provide crucial health services, in-
terruptions to the electronic banking system, problems to natural disaster 
weather forecasting, as well as threats to national and international security. 
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty 1967 seeks to protect this global pub-
lic interest by imposing an obligation on the appropriate State Party to author-
ize and continually supervise space activities of non-governmental agencies. 
Article VI also requires States Parties to ensure that national activities  in outer 
space, seemingly including those of non-governmental agencies, are carried 
out in compliance with the treaty. In contrast, private commercial entities are 
not party to the Outer Space Treaty 1967. The mainstream position therefore 
is that they are not legally required under international law to comply with its 
provisions. In other words, private actors may cause harm—which may be 
irreversible—to the outer space environment or the Earth through their space 
 
 6 Scott Pace, Space Development, Law, and Values, Address at the IISL Galloway 
Space Law Symposium (Dec. 13, 2017), available at https://spacepolicyonline.com/wp-co 
ntent/uploads/2017/12/Scott-Pace-to-Galloway-Symp-Dec-13-2017.pdf; Tim Fernholtz, 
Space is Not a “Global Commons,” Top Trump Space Official Says, QUARTZ (Dec. 19, 
2017), https://qz.com/1159540/space-is-not-a-global-commons-top-trump-space-official- 
says/. 
 7 ANDREAS KULICK, GLOBAL PUBLIC INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
(2012). 
 8 Ram Jakhu, Legal Issues Relating to the Global Public Interest in Outer Space, 32 J. 
SPACE L. 1, 32 (2006). 
 9 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27 1967, 610 U.N.T.S. 
205, 18 U.S.T. 2410. 
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activities or they may intentionally and unnecessarily contribute to the risk of 
harm without any form of international accountability, though they may be 
sanctioned at the national level. 
As demonstrated by Swarm, private commercial space actors may be will-
ing to bear the burden of domestic penalties where the likely punishment is 
outweighed by the benefits of breaching the domestic law. Swarm’s sanction 
was quite a light touch because the fine was not much more than the amount 
of money the company had received in public grants. This means Swarm vio-
lated the law and suffered very little financial consequence. FCC commis-
sioner, Michael O’Reilly, conceded that, in his opinion, the fine was not 
enough to deter similar behavior.10 Furthermore, the FCC granted Swarm li-
censes while the investigation was ongoing. Such action essentially amounted 
to retrospective authorization and also does little for specific or general deter-
rence.11 
So, how do we address situations like the Swarm incident at a global level? 
I propose a two-part international accountability mechanism specifically for 
private commercial space actors. The first part would comprise global mini-
mum standards, including the duty to only conduct commercial activities 
where they have in fact been authorized by national regulators. Attached to 
these standards would be globally accepted penalties. Currently, whether pri-
vate commercial space actors such as Swarm are sanctioned for violations is 
left entirely to the discretion of states. The problem with this is that some 
states may choose not to impose any sanctions in order to advance their do-
mestic space industry, or, where they do impose penalties, it may be vastly 
different to that imposed by other countries. As profit is the primary objective 
of private commercial actors, diversity in domestic penalties will lead to fo-
rum shopping and the lowest common denominator where, as Doucet notes, 
“the ultimate casualty will be safety of operations and sustainability of the 
outer space environment.”12 In order to avoid jeopardizing the safety and sus-
tainability of outer space, minimum standards applicable across the globe for 
private space actors should be formulated. The second part to this accounta-
bility mechanism would be procedures by which compliance with these min-
imum standards can be assessed. 
My proposal raises a number of questions. Would these standards be bind-
ing or voluntary? As much as they may be welcomed, internationally legally 
binding obligations for private commercial space actors are unlikely in the 
near future given the current geo-political climate. Alternatively, voluntary 
 
 10 Michael O’Rielly, Comm’r, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Statement Re: Swarm Tech-
nologies, Inc. (Dec. 20, 2018), available at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-1 
8-184A3.pdf. 
 11 For a simple overview of deterrence theory, see Kelli D Tomlinson, An Examination 
of Deterrence Theory: Where Do We Stand?, 80 FED. PROB. J. 33, 33–38. (2016). 
 12 Gilles Doucet, Outer Space SARPs: A Mechanism for Implementation of Space Safety 
Standards, 6 J. SPACE SAFETY ENGINEERING 145, 145–59 (2019). 
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measures could be introduced. Though some private commercial space actors 
may choose not to subscribe, voluntary measures of global accountability 
could nevertheless be of benefit. Reputational damage and soft enforcement 
mechanisms, particularly those which are market-based, may be effective in 
encouraging responsible and sustainable space conduct by private commercial 
space actors. Additional questions arise: How would compliance be assessed, 
what body or organization would impose the penalties and how would they be 
enforced? These matters require significant consideration but are possible to 
address. 
It is important to note that I do not propose we displace the current inter-
national responsibility of states for non-state actors as provided by Article VI 
of the Outer Space Treaty 1967. Rather my suggestion is to introduce com-
plementary measures, some form of global accountability mechanism for pri-
vate actors which would create and entrench norms parallel to the obligations 
of states under international space law, perhaps though with more specificity. 
In conclusion, the Swarm incident raises a number of issues but what is 
important to the theme of this panel about governance and norms relating to 
potential commercial uses of space, is that conduct like Swarm’s does not de-
velop into a norm. It is also important that in the hopefully rare circumstances 
in which such conduct occurs in the future, proportionate punishment swiftly 
follows in order to aid deterrence. If we start accepting the type of intentional 
behavior exhibited by Swarm, chaos will ensue, there will be more risks of 
collisions and more debris unaccounted for. Over time, this would reduce the 
safe and sustainable use of outer space which is obviously against both busi-
ness interests and the global public interest. It is therefore vital that where 
private commercial space actors have the benefit of utilizing the global com-
mons that is outer space, they equally have the burden of being globally ac-
countable for said use. 
 
 
